|
POLITICS-IRAQ: Kurd's Voting Shenanigans Cloud
Key Province
Gareth Porter
Inter Press Service News Agency
WASHINGTON, Sep 28 (IPS) - If the referendum on Iraq's draft
constitution next month is conducted fairly, it now appears very
likely that the document will be defeated by a two-thirds majority
in the three Sunni-dominated provinces of Anbar, Salahadeen and
Nineveh, plunging Iraq into a new political crisis.
However, one way such a defeat could be averted is by massive
vote fraud in the key province of Nineveh. According to an account
provided by the U.S. liaison with the local election commission,
supported by physical evidence collected by the Independent Electoral
Commission of Iraq (IECI), Kurdish officials in Nineveh province
tried to carry out just such a ballot-stuffing scheme in last
January's election.
The Sunni Arab majority of about 1.7 million in Nineveh --
including Sunni insurgent organisations -- appears to be united
behind a "no" vote on the constitution. Kurds number
only about 200,000 and non-Kurdish, non-Arab minorities another
500-600,000.
The non-Arab, non-Kurdish minorities -- Assyrian Christians,
Shabaks, Yezidis and Turkmen -- which hold the balance in the
province, are overwhelmingly opposed to the constitution.
Heavy-handed control by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
of non-Kurdish towns, exercised through Kurdish militia and intelligence
presence in non-Kurdish areas, has alienated all four groups.
They fear the draft constitution would legitimise Kurdish plans
to absorb into Kurdistan the areas of Nineveh where they are
the majority, eliminating the limited recognition of status and
rights as minorities they now have.
In the January election, the Kurds dealt with the problem
of being a relatively small minority in the province by stuffing
the ballot boxes, as recounted by Maj. Anthony Cruz, an Army
reserve civil affairs officer assigned to work with the province
electoral commission.
Cruz, now back in Los Angeles, provided a detailed account
of the election in Nineveh to IPS in interviews.
The 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division ("Stryker Brigade")
was responsible for getting ballot boxes and ballots to polling
places on the Nineveh plain in January's election. But it relied
on battle-hardened Kurdish pershmurga militiamen to maintain
security in the towns and villages, and did not know its way
around the area well enough to deliver ballot boxes there with
Kurdish help, according to Cruz.
So the Brigade agreed to send a U.S. convoy with the voting
materials to meet a Kurdish delegation in the Kurdish town of
Faida on the border of Kurdistan 50 miles north of Mosul, so
that the convoy could be guided to the largely Christian and
Shabak towns on the Plain of Nineveh.
When the convoy arrived in Faida the day before the election,
however, the promised Kurdish guides never came. Instead, says
Cruz, the Kurdish mayor of the town came demanding the ballots
for what he called Kurdish towns on the list. The convoy commander
wanted to take all the ballots back, because the mission had
been aborted.
A tense standoff followed, and the convoy commander called
Cruz for a decision on what to do with the ballots. He advised
the commander to give the mayor enough ballots for four towns,
and the convoy returned to Mosul.
On election day, Cruz recalls, the U.S. military tried to
find helicopters to carry the ballot materials out to the six
remaining district towns on the list, but was were able get ballots
to only one town, Bashiqa, which is almost entirely Christian,
Shabak and Yezidi, before the 5:00 p.m. close of voting.
But according to Cruz, Kurdish militiamen stole the ballots
boxes from the polling place, returning them later after obviously
tampering with them and offering bribes to the election workers
to accept them.
Meanwhile a much more ambitious vote fraud scheme was unfolding
in Sinjar, a relatively small district town in the west known
to be a predominantly Sunni Arab area.
Around 12,000 ballots had been sent to Sinjar, but on election
day KDP officials in Sinjar requested a number of ballots far
in excess of the estimated electorate in the town and surrounding
villages, according to Cruz. He recalls that the request was
supported by the office of the interim president of Iraq, Sunni
Arab Ghazi Al-Yawer.
Cruz remembers joking about the "500 percent voter participation
rate" in Sinjar. Nevertheless, the Stryker Brigade Combat
Team complied with the request for the ballots.
Later, the province Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq
(IECI) forwarded 38 ballot boxes, 174 plastic sacks and 14 cardboard
cartons of ballots that had obviously been tampered with to the
national IECI. In some boxes, reams of ballot papers that had
not even been folded were visible. In others, boxes had been
resealed with red and green duct tape.
When Cruz asked the local IECI director how many of the fraudulent
ballots had come from Sinjar, he was told, "All of them."
The average number of ballots per ballot box nationwide was
500, and if each of the 236 boxes and bags of votes from Sinjar
had that many ballots, those bags would have contained about
115,000 ballots. The total number of legitimate votes in Nineveh
was only 190,000.
The Kurds apparently wanted to bolster their claims on Sinjar
and much of the Plain of Nineveh. They also were apparently trying
to ensure that non-Kurdish minorities would not have enough votes
to gain representation in the interim National Assembly or in
the province council.
It did succeed in reducing the vote for the national Assyrian
Christian list to exactly 3,346, despite an electorate approaching
100,000. The Iraqi Turkmen Front list garnered only 1,342 votes,
despite an electorate that was many times larger.
Judging from the large disparity between the 77,000 legitimate
votes for the Kurdish list for the national assembly and the
110,000 legitimate votes for the Kurdish list for province council,
the Kurds deliberately shifted a substantial number of votes
to Al-Yawer in return for his role in getting the additional
ballots need for the vote-stuffing exercise. Al-Yawer was threatened
with a minimal vote in the province because of the Sunni boycott.
Although it displayed the boxes and bags of fraudulent ballots,
the national IECI downplayed the seriousness of the ballot-stuffing
in Nineveh and covered up the Kurdish role in it.
In his press briefing on Feb. 8, IECI spokesman Farid Ayar
blamed the ballot fraud on unidentified "militiamen or armed
men". According to Maj. Cruz, however, the only such incident
in the province was in Bashiqa.
Ayar refused to divulge which party would have profited from
the fraudulent ballots, telling the journalists, "I can't
accuse any party, because we don't know."
The KDP obviously miscalculated in thinking that electoral
officials in Nineveh could be bribed to turn a blind eye to such
crude ballot stuffing. But no damage was done by the failed attempt.
The IECI helped by diverting press attention from the Kurds,
and U.S. news media never dug into the story behind the mountain
of fraudulent ballots exhibited by the commission.
In the constitutional referendum, the Shiite government will
share the Kurdish interest in doing whatever is necessary to
avert the defeat of the constitution in Nineveh. Meanwhile, the
U.S. military remains heavily dependent on Kurds in Nineveh.
The KDP may well believe that a more sophisticated Kurdish ballot-stuffing
scheme will work on October 15.
*Gareth Porter is an historian and national security policy
analyst. His latest book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance
of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam", was published
in June. (END/2005)
Related Araticle:
Kurds Election Fraud.
Kurds Prevent Assyrian Representation, Continue Divisive
Formula in Iraq
March 28 , 05
(AINA) -- The convening of the Iraqi National Assembly on
March 16 symbolized a bitter realization for Iraqi Assyrians
that the Iraqi road to democracy remains dotted with pitfalls.
Assyrian Christians (also known as Chaldeans and Syriacs) were
left reeling following the final certification of the elections
on February 17 by the Iraqi High Election Commission (IHEC).
Despite formal worldwide protests1 by over a dozen Assyrian
organizations regarding vote fraud, threats, and killings targeting
Assyrians, the IHEC final report white washed any protests by
Assyrians and failed to accommodate demands for voting rights
for disenfranchised minorities in the Nineveh Plain including
Assyrians, Yezidis, Shabak, and Turkman. Even the UN report,
eager to move ahead with a semblance of governance in the new
Iraq, ignored all minority complaints of nearly total disenfranchisement.
For Assyrian Christians, referred to as ChaldoAssyrians in
the Iraqi Transitional Administrative Law (TAL, English, Arabic),
democracy in Iraq has remained elusive and, at times, downright
dangerous in some areas. A pre-election terror campaign by warlord
Masoud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), as well as
beheadings, beatings, mutilations, kidnappings and church bombings
in Baghdad and Mosul, succeeded in drastically reducing Assyrian
voter turnout in Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Mosul. On election day,
when thousands of would be voters defied threats in the Nineveh
Plain, armed thugs of the KDP simply stole the ballot boxes
destined to the towns and villages of the Nineveh Plain (AINA,
01-31-05, 02-27-05). Voter lockout of Assyrians in and out of
Iraq was also suspected.
The end result for Assyrian Christians was an abysmal showing
in the National Assembly. The disenfranchisement of Assyrians
was to a level perhaps never before seen in Iraq, including
during the reign of Saddam Hussein. Out of all of the independent
Assyrian Iraqi slates including the Assyrian National Gathering
(139), the Rafidain Democratic Coalition (148), the Rafidain
National list (204) and the Chaldean Democratic Union Party
(223), only one representative reached the necessary minimum
threshold level of 29,000 votes, Mr. Yonadam Kanna of the Assyrian
Democratic Movement (ADM). That one single representative was
all that could be mustered from a population of 1-1.5 million
Assyrian Christians inside Iraq, not including the several hundred
thousand outside the country.
Another Assyrian Christian representative succeeded to the
National Assembly through the secular Iraqi List slate (285),
headed by interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. Mrs. Wijdan Mikhael,
although not part of an independent Assyrian political organization,
has none the less received hopeful praise by some Iraqi Assyrians
as someone who is aware of and sensitive to the critical issues
facing indigenous Assyrian Christians in Iraq. Mrs. Mikhael's
election through the Iraqi List slate reflects support given
by some Iraqi Assyrian Christians to the moderate secular leadership
of Ayad Allawi.
In marked contrast, the election of four other Christian
representatives from the Kurdish slate (Mrs. Jacklin Qawsan
Zomaya, Mr. Ablahad Afram Sawa, Mr. Salim Petros Elias, Dr.
Goriel Isho Khamis) poses a grave and ominous threat to legitimate
Assyrian Christian aspirations in Iraq. The four Kurdish list
Christians represent smaller fringe groups who, according to
one analyst "have no standing in the communities they claim
to represent." Moreover, "these groups knew they had
no chance of garnering support; as a result, they allied themselves
with Kurds simply to gain a presence in the National Assembly."
Mr. Ablahad Afram remains one prime example. A self-described
member of the KDP, Mr. Afram established the Chaldean Democratic
Union under the explicit direction of the KDP in order to create
a sectarian split between Christians from the Church of the
East and the Chaldean Church. One analyst summarized "Mr.
Afram's organization is an artificial creation and, were it
not for direct support from the KDP, would not exist at all.
It has no platform or mission other than to periodically declare
-- at the behest of the KDP -- that Chaldeans and Assyrians are
separate people."
Another representative on the Kurdish list is Dr. Goreal
Esho Khamis of the ChaldoAssur Organization, an affiliate of
the Kurdish Communist Party. The third Christian member on the
Kurdish list, Mr. Salim Petros Elias was elected as a representative
of the Chaldean Cultural Society, another front organization
sponsored by the KDP. Rounding out the list, Ms. Jacklin Zomaya
was elected to the Assembly as a member of the Assyrian Patriotic
Party. The APP likewise allied themselves with the Kurdish list
because as one observer noted "fearing elimination and irrelevance,
they joined with the KDP. In their calculus, they could not
have won on their own."
As far as the KDP is concerned, directing 4 out of 6 of the
total Assyrian representatives in the Assembly virtually assures
them near total control over Assyrian political aspirations.
With Assyrians being a troublesome obstacle to Kurdish expansion
into the Nineveh Plain, the KDP scheme hopes to capitalize on
two important points regarding Assyrian Christians: institutionalizing
a formal legal split amongst various Assyrian Christian communities
based on self-identifying terms and the subversion of calls
for an Assyrian self-administered area in the Nineveh Plain.
Following the fall of the Baathist regime, the Assyrian Democratic
Organization (ADO) and the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM)
cosponsored the Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Conference in Baghdad
during October, 2003. The two most important points of agreement
that emerged from the conference were the consensus decision
by all of the communities to legally refer the "Chaldean
Syriac Assyrian" people as "ChaldoAssyrians,"
and to demand the establishment of an Assyrian self-administered
area in the Nineveh Plain. Through perseverance, both points
were incorporated into the TAL, with article 53D guaranteeing
administrative rights for ChaldoAssyrians.
The KDP strategy is geared to attack these major Assyrian
political objectives head on. First, by propping up groups who
maintain fabricated sectarian-ethnic identities and declare
that Assyrians and Chaldeans are separate people, the KDP hopes
to fragment the third largest demographic group in Iraq -- the
Christians -- into smaller, less significant fragments. As one
Iraqi noted, "Mr. Ablahad Afram has evolved into the point
man to drive the KDP wedge into the consensus position."
Secondly, the Assyrian desire for a self-administered area
outside the direct control of the Kurdish occupied region is
anathema to the larger Kurdish vision of an ever expanding "Kurdistan"
reaching west through the Nineveh and Dohuk provinces to the
Syrian border. As one Assyrian analyst noted "They (the
KDP) have drawn their map and it includes the whole of the Nineveh
Plain." Furthermore, in response to independent Assyrian
calls for a self-administered area, the analyst added "it
is widely believed that the four Christian representatives on
the Kurdish list have foresworn any ambition for administrative
rights in the Nineveh Plain except as a wholly owned and subjugated
portion of the Kurdish occupied area." For Assyrians, that
leaves only one or at best two representatives, themselves under
threat, to fend for themselves in an Assembly of 275 controlled
by much larger blocs.
For the KDP, appointing the bulk of the Assyrian Christian
representation in the Assembly has kept alive KDP dreams of
incorporating the Nineveh province into the Kurdish occupied
region. For the Assyrian leadership, the move has been a predictable
continuation of the ongoing policy of KDP expansion, then consolidation,
and then homogenization of adjacent areas by ethnic cleansing.
One analyst summarized the KDP strategy by noting "The
KDP has executed a carefully orchestrated 3 pronged strategy
of violently terrorizing the Assyrian community, deliberately
blocking any real ability to participate in the democratic process,
and finally, cynically propping up illegitimate organizations
to be our official representatives."
One activist adamantly summarized the widely held mainstream
Assyrian view by saying "Mr. Barzani can add as many Christians
to his list as he likes. These so called leaders are Barzani's
representatives, not ours. They don't have the backing of the
community and widely known to be there simply to subvert our
genuine and legitimate aspirations as a people." For the
indigenous Assyrian Christians as a whole, the very process
that produced this scenario remains at its root undemocratic
and illegitimate.
|